

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: HIGHLIGHTS, POST-PLENARY CONVERSATIONS, JUNE 10, 1977  
(SALT TWO-1218)

1. (ROWNY-BELETSKY, A-1568

BOMBER VARIANTS

REFERRING TO THE PLENARY STATEMENT MADE BY MINISTER SEMENOV ON 3 JUNE, ROWNY NOTED THAT THE USSR DELEGATION, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, STATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTENTION OF CONVERTING THEIR TANKERS, RECONNAISSANCE AND ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT INTO HEAVY BOMBERS. ROWNY ASKED HIM IF THIS STATEMENT OF INTENTION MEANT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO ASSUME SUCH AN OBLIGATION.

BELETSKY REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. ROWNY THEN PRESSED BELETSKY AS TO WHETHER THE OBLIGATION WOULD CARRY WITH IT ASSURANCES, WHICH WE COULD VERIFY, THAT SUCH CONVERSIONS WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE. BELETSKY WENT INTO A LONG EXPLANATION OF THE COST, LABOR AND TIME INVOLVED IN MAKING SUCH CONVERSIONS BUT IN EFFECT AVOIDED ANSWERING MY QUESTION AS TO VERIFIABLE ASSURANCES. WHEN PRESSED FURTHER,

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BELETSKY SAID THAT THE ASSUMPTION OF AN OBLIGATION DID NOT CARRY WITH IT ANY NECESSITY FOR ASSURING THAT THE INTENTION OF THE OBLIGATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT

BELETSKY REPEATED AIRLIER SOVIET ARGUMENTS THAT THE CONTENT

OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION AND METHODS OF ITS TRANSMISSION ARE INTERNAL MATTERS WHICH ARE OF NO CONCERN TO THE OTHER SIDE. ROWNY REVIEWED OUR US POSITION THAT WHILE EACH SIDE SHOULD RETAIN ITS FREEDOM TO IMPROVE AND ARRIVE AT ITS OWN TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS, SUCH FREEDOM CANNOT BE USED TO JUSTIFY DELIBERATELY CONCEALING INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO VERIFICATION. BELETSKY MADE A LONG ARGUMENT IN WHICH HE ASSERTED THAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO RESTRICT INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO THEIR TELEMETRY PRACTICES NECESSARY TO HANDLE AN INCREASED VOLUME OF DATA ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING. FURTHER, THAT SUCH RESTRICTION WOULD LIMIT THE QUANTITY OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION CONNECTED WITH FUTURE TESTING. ROWNY TOLD BELETSKY THE QUANTITY OF TELEMETRY WAS NOT IN QUESTION BUT THAT THE HEART OF THE MATTER WAS THE METHOD OF TRANSMITTING TELEMETRY WHICH COULD DELIBERATELY IMPEDE VERIFICATION.

2. (JOHNSON-SHCHUKIN, A-1570)

#### NON-DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT

SHCHUKIN REPEATED POINTS IN A PREVIOUS DISCUSSION IN WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED THAT THERE COULD BE ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR POLITICAL REASONS FOR PUTTING SILOS IN FORESTS. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THIS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED CONCEALMENT. HE CONTINUED BY POINTING OUT THAT THE LOCATION OF CERTAIN SYSTEMS FOR TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT ARE OFTEN DICTATED BY GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS. FOR INSTANCE, A LARGE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION IS NORTH OF THE SIXTIETH PARALLEL, AND LOW  
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LEVEL ILLUMINATION AND DARKNESS PERSIST FOR SEVERAL MONTHS EACH YEAR. HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT DELAY TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS FOR THAT PERIOD OF TIME, AND, THEREFORE, THEY DO A GREAT DEAL OF TESTING IN THE NORTHERN LATITUDES SUCH AS THE BARENTS AND WHITE SEAS.

SHCHUKIN SAID, "IT IS FOR REASONS LIKE THESE THAT WE OBJECT TO THE INCLUSIONS OF AN OBLIGATION IN THE TREATY UNDER WHICH SUCH NON-DELIBERATE MEASURES COULD BE QUESTIONED AND MISINTERPRETED." HE EXPANDED THE GENERAL SUBJECT TO THE EFFECTS OF METEOROLOGY. HE RECALLED THAT THE WEATHER OVER THE SOVIET UNION IS CHARACTERIZED BY A GREAT DEAL OF CLOUDY WEATHER, AND THE FACT THAT TESTS TAKE PLACE UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS ALSO MIGHT BE REGARDED AS DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT UNDER THE US INTERPRETATION. THE CONDITIONS IN THE US, HE OBSERVED, ARE QUITE DIFFERENT WHERE THE NUMBER OF CLEAR DAYS IS MUCH GREATER, SO THE SITUATION FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES IS NOT SYMMETRICAL.

CRUISE MISSILES

SHCHUKIN RAISED THE SUBJECT BY STATING, "I KNOW WE ARE NOT SUPPOSE TO TALK ABOUT CRUISE MISSILES HERE, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT," THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH FOLLOWS:

"WHEN YOU HAVE A LARGE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AND A LARGE NUMBER OF ARMS, AS IS THE CASE WITH THE US/USSR, IT IS POSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN THAT A BALANCE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS BALANCE CAN BE UPSET BY NEW DISCOVERIES, ESPECIALLY INSOFAR AS THIRD COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED. IN THIS RESPECT, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE, BUT I DO HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF PERSONAL CONCERN WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU. THE CRUISE MISSILE CAN BE A SERIOUS DESTABILIZING ELEMENT, ESPECIALLY BEARING IN MIND GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATIONS. I DON'T WANT TO COMPARE ICBM'S

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WITH CRUISE MISSLES WHEN BOTH ARE NUCLEAR ARMED, BUT A SITUATION COULD ARISE WHEN THE APPEARANCE OF THIS NEW WEAPON COULD CREATE GREAT UNCERTAINTY, AND THIS COULD BRING US CLOSER TO WAR. WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT OTHER COUNTRIES EXIST BESIDES THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR, AND THAT THESE OTHER COUNTRIES OFTEN CONSTITUTE A GREATER THREAT TO THE USSR THAN THE US FROM THE CRUISE MISSILE."EARLE

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